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1 Introduction
Steven Brakman and Ben J. Heijdra
1.1 Introduction
In speaking of theories of monopolistic or imperfect competition as ‘revolutions,’
I know in advance that I shall provoke dissent. There are minds that by tempera-
ment will define away every proposed revolution. For them it is enough to point
out that Keynes in 1936 had some partial anticipator in 1836. Newton is just a
guy getting toomuch credit for the accretion of knowledge that covered centuries.
A mountain is just a high hill; a hill merely a bulging plain. Such people remind
me of the grammar-school teacher we all had, who would never give 100 to a
paper on the ground that ‘No one is perfect.’ (Samuelson, 1967, p. 138)
Edward Hastings Chamberlin is the author of one of the most influential works
of all time in economic theory – The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, which
entered its eighth edition in 1962. Along with Lord Keynes’s General Theory, it
wrought one of the two veritable revolutions in economic theory in this century.
(Dust cover text of Kuenne, 1967)
Although we stress the importance of the contribution by AvinashDixit
and Joseph Stiglitz (1977) throughout this book, the history of monopo-
listic competition is much longer than the past twenty-five years or so and
goes back at least seventy years. The success of the Dixit–Stiglitz model
of monopolistic competition might have come as a surprise to students of
the history of economic thought, as it was by no means the first attempt
to deal with imperfect markets or monopolistic competition. However,
where the earlier attempts failed the Dixit–Stiglitz approach turned out
to be very successful and has the potential ‘for classic status’ (see Neary,1
chapter 8 in this volume).
In this introduction we will briefly review the two waves of literature
on monopolistic competition theory, namely the one that started in 1933
and the one that commenced in 1977. The claim of this book is that the
second attempt to model monopolistic competition was far more suc-
cessful than the first, essentially because the second attempt introduced
We thank Avinash Dixit for comments on an earlier draft.
1 According to Peter Neary, ‘the first step on the road to classic status [is]: to be widely
cited but never read. (The second step, to be widely quoted but never cited.)’
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a formalisation that had all the relevant characteristics of monopolistic
competition but was still relatively easy to handle.
This collection of papers will show that the re-formulation by Dixit
and Stiglitz has contributed significantly to many areas of research; the
main ones being international trade theory,macroeconomics, growth the-
ory and economic geography. But even today the concept of monopolistic
competition is not always appreciated. As David Kreps puts it in his in-
fluential micro textbook ‘were it not for the presence of this theory in
most lower level texts we would ignore it here altogether’ (1990, p. 344).
Kreps dismisses monopolistic competition as being too unrealistic, and
challenges his readers to come up with at least one sector that could con-
vincingly be described by monopolistic competition. This collection of
essays, however, takes for granted that the Dixit–Stiglitz reformulation of
monopolistic competition has become very successful, and asks why that
is the case. This does not mean that the authors of the essays are uncriti-
cal about the model. The aim of this collection is to show why the model
has become mainstream in such a short period of time and what we can
expect from future developments regarding the modelling of imperfect
markets.
This introductory chapter is organised as follows. In section 1.2 we
briefly discuss the literature predating the first monopolistic competition
revolution. This literature strongly hinted at the importance of increasing
returns to scale and imperfect market forms but was unable to come
up with a satisfactory model in which both phenomena could play a
meaningful role.
In section 1.3 we briefly discuss (what we call) the first monopolis-
tic competition revolution, namely the one that was started by Edward
Hastings Chamberlin and Joan Robinson in the 1930s. We show that
by the mid-1960s most (but not all) leading economists had come to
the conclusion that the Chamberlin–Robinson revolution had essentially
failed. In our view, there are two reasons for this lack of acceptance of the
theory. First, the timing of the first revolution was unfortunate in that it
coincided with the Great Depression and the emergence of the Keynesian
revolution in macroeconomics. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
Chamberlin and co-workers failed to come upwith a canonicalmodel em-
bodying the key elements of the theory. It was not so much Chamberlin’s
ideas that were rejected but rather hismodelling approach that was deemed
to be unworkable.
In section 1.4 we turn to the second monopolistic competition revo-
lution, namely the successful one that was started in the mid-1970s by
Dixit, Stiglitz and Michael Spence. The timing of this second revolution
was much better. The events in the world – the petroleum cartel, high
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inflation, productivity slowdown, etc. – made the profession painfully
aware of the limitations of the paradigm of perfect competition, and
made it more receptive to theories that departed from that paradigm
in all its dimensions, i.e. returns to scale, uncertainty and information,
strategic behaviour, etc. In addition, the second revolution caught on be-
cause Dixit and Stiglitz managed to come up with a canonical model of
monopolistic competition. We present a very simple version of the Dixit–
Stiglitzmodel and show how itmanages to capture the keyChamberlinian
insights.
Finally, in section 1.5 we present a broad overview of the chapters in
this book.
1.2 Precursory thoughts on imperfect competition2
By the end of the nineteenth century two market forms dominated the
discussion of economic analysis, namely monopoly and perfect compe-
tition. The former assumes a single firm with exclusive control over its
output and themarket, resulting in profits that are larger than in any other
market form. In contrast, the latter assumes a large number of sellers of
a homogeneous product, where each individual firm has no control over
its price. Free entry and exit of firms ensures that long-run profits are
zero. Perfect competition was introduced to show that in some sense it
is optimal and in fact represents an end-state, meaning that competition
between buyers or sellers has come to an end and neither party can in-
crease utility or profits by changing its behaviour. Changes occur only if
exogenous variables change, but the question then becomes how fast and
under what circumstances the new equilibrium will be reached. Com-
petition might not actually lead to the blissful state but market forces
are always pointing the economy in the right direction.3 Monopoly by
contrast maximises profits of the firm but from a social point of view is
sub-optimal.
This state of affairs is reflected in Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Eco-
nomics, that presented these twomarket forms as the basic analytical tools
to analyse markets. Other market forms are hybrids in between these two
2 Our historical overview is rather succinct owing to space considerations. Interested read-
ers are referred to Triffin (1940), Eaton and Lipsey (1989, pp. 761–6) and Archibald
(1987, pp. 531–4) for more extensive surveys.
3 As Arrow and Debreu showed, in general the conditions for a unique and stable (Wal-
rasian) equilibrium are that (1) production is subject to constant or diminishing returns
to scale, (2) commodities are substitutes (meaning that a price increase raises the demand
for other products), (3) external effects are absent and (4) there is a complete forward
market for all goods. Assumptions (1) and (3) in particular are dropped in monopolistic
competition.
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polar cases.4 Mainstream economics did not bother too much to analyse
imperfect market forms, because ‘the large majority of cases that occur in
practice are nothing but mixtures and hybrids of these two’ (Schumpeter,
1954, p. 975).
However, Marshall was aware that other market forms were not simple
combinations of perfect competition andmonopoly. The special nature of
imperfect markets were conveyed to him in the form of the duopoly mod-
els developed by Cournot, Bertrand and Edgeworth in the second half
of the nineteenth century. The analysis of Cournot (1838) was particu-
larly important for him, as it handed him the apparatus to analyse market
forms in the first place. The problem with these models was that the re-
sults depended verymuch on special assumptions. AlthoughMarshall did
not develop his own theory of imperfect competition, his awareness of the
so-called ‘Special Markets’ paved the way for later theories of imperfect
competition developed by Chamberlin and Robinson.
Notwithstanding some lip-service to the theory of imperfect compe-
tition, perfect competition dominated the analysis during this time and
othermarket formswere considered to be ‘imperfect’.However, in perfect
competition, where each seller or buyer has no influence onmarket prices,
there is no longer room for individual competition, and forces leading to
industry growth are absent. The difficulty was then to reconcile the the-
ory of the market and that of the individual firm. Simple observation of
reality often contradicted the conclusions of (partial) supply and demand
analysis: diminishing returns for the individual firm is not an obstacle to
expand production. And average costs are diminishing at the point were
firms stop expanding output. This state of affairs troubled Marshall, as
decreasing (average) cost curves are incompatible with perfect competi-
tion. Marshall tried to solve this by introducing diminishing returns for
the individual firm (for individual firms, production factors are in fixed
supply), and external economies for the whole industry. The introduction
of external economies of scale at the industry level ensured that the com-
petitive equilibrium could be rescued. The central idea is that external
economies of scale create an interdependence between supply curves; the
combined supply of all firms reduces industry costs and ensures that the
combination of lower prices and increased supply can be an equilibrium.
External economies of scale are compatible with an industry equilibrium,
because an increase in demand will still increase the price for individual
4 However, according to Schumpeter, Marshall ‘had no theory of monopolistic compe-
tition. But he pointed toward it by considering a firm’s Special Market’ (Schumpeter,
1954, p. 840).
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firms, as the marginal cost curve of each firm is upward sloping and each
firm is operating at the minimum of its average cost curve. The price
increase could stimulate new firms to enter the market, reducing (aver-
age) costs and raising combined supply. With internal economies of scale
a market equilibrium is not possible as each individual firm can always
undercut its rivals.
According to Marshall whether or not external economies could be
encountered in practice depended on the general characteristics of an
industry and the environment of the industry, like the localisation of an
industry. In Marshall’s words:
subsidiary trades grow up in the neighbourhood, supplying it with implements
and materials, organizing its traffic, and in many ways conducing to the economy
of its material . . . the economic use of expensive machinery can sometimes be
attained in a very high degree in a district in which there is a large aggregate
production of the same kind, . . . subsidiary industries devoting themselves each
to one small branch of the process of production, and working it for a great many
of their neighbours, are able to keep in constant use machinery of the most highly
specialized character, and to make it pay its expenses. (Marshall, 1920, p. 225)
In modern jargon the linkages described in this quotation are so-called
backward and forward linkages; the backward linkage is that firms use
other firms’ output as intermediate production factors, the forward link-
age is that its own product is also used as an intermediate production
factor by others.5
Furthermore, according toMarshall a thick labourmarket also benefits
firms:
Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good
choice of workers with the special skill which they require; while men seeking
employment naturally go to places where there are many employers who need
such skill as theirs and where therefore it is likely to find a goodmarket. (Marshall,
1920, pp. 225–6)
These factors combined explain industry growth and show why:
the mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air . . . if
one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions
of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas. (Marshall, 1920,
p. 225)
5 The quote from Marshall merely seems to shift the problem to a different level, in the
sense that external economies of scale in one industry must be explained by internal
economies of scale in an upstream or downstream industry linked to it, and that raises
doubts about sustainability of perfect competition in that other industry.
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For Marshall, however, his analysis of external economies created an
additional problem, because he thought that internal economies of scale
were at least as important as external economies (Blaug, 1997). In the
presence of internal economies of scale the growth of an industry would
benefit the largest firms (and create monopolies) and thus change the
competitive forces within such an industry. Marshall had to introduce
the concept of the representative firm to deal with this incompatibility.
By introducing the representative firm, perfect competition and (external)
economies of scale could be made consistent. But again in this case, as
with perfect competition, strategic interaction between firms has been
assumed away because firms are by assumption ‘representative’ for the
whole industry.
But the consistency problems in Marshall’s analysis of the market were
not solved even by the representative firm.Marshall’s famous period anal-
ysis assumed that in the long run the supply curve was a straight line. And
this means that in the long run the volume of production of an individ-
ual firm is indeterminate: there is no unique intersection of the supply
curve and a given price. So, Marshall’s theory of perfect competition has
no way of dealing with situations where the (long-run) marginal costs
are constant (or declining in the presence of economies of scale). This
state of affairs was most poignantly put forward by Sraffa (1926). Ac-
cording to Sraffa market imperfections due to returns to scale are not
simple frictions, ‘but are themselves active forces which produce perma-
nent and even cumulative effects’. And he added yet another problem.
Decliningmarginal costs would imply that themarket is served by a single
firm. But, according to Sraffa, in practice firms operate under declining
marginal costs without monopolising the whole market. According to
him, the combination of a declining supply curve and a negatively sloped
demand curve limits the size of production. The idea behind a declining
demand curve is that buyers are not indifferent between different suppli-
ers. Each firm has his own special market; products are usually imperfect
substitutes and have their own special characteristics.
In a sense Sraffa added to the confusion rather than solving the prob-
lem of combining increasing returns and the theory of market compe-
tition. The error Sraffa made was that he did not distinguish between
price and marginal revenue, which was remarkable because the concept
of marginal revenue had already been developed in a mathematical ap-
pendix in Marshall’s Principles, in which he restates the monopoly theory
developed by Cournot.6 This was pointed out (again) by Harrod in
6 Marshall casts his analysis in terms of net revenue, and only implicitly discusses marginal
revenue. The concept of marginal revenue had to be re-invented (Robinson, 1933). This
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1930.7 For Marshall it was a minor issue and he did not make use of
this instrument any further, because he did not need it in his analysis of
perfect competition.
This was broadly speaking the state of affairs in the 1920s and 1930s.
It was realised that the existence of economies of scale (of one sort or
another) implied imperfect market forms, but it remained difficult to
construct a satisfactory equilibrium concept for such imperfect market
forms. On the one hand there was perfect competition, and on the other
hand there was monopoly. Other market forms were considered to be
some kind of hybrid of these two extreme forms of competition. So, one
could suffice to analyse the two extreme cases in treating all other forms
as an implicit mix of the two fundamental forms of competition. But
no satisfactory theory of the market existed in which constant or declin-
ing marginal and average costs could be made consistent with market
equilibrium. This led in the 1930s to a new theory of price determina-
tion. One can agree with Schumpeter (1954, p. 1150) that the confusion
caused byMarshall was a very fertile one.8 Marshall’s analysis of the firm
and economies of scale led him to develop the concept of the represen-
tative firm which invited a lively discussion on market equilibrium and
returns to scale and this set the stage for the analysis of monopolistic
competition.
1.3 Monopolistic competition in the 1930s
In 1933 two books appeared that changed the way economists dealt with
imperfect competition, namely JoanRobinson’sThe Economics of Imperfect
Competition and Edward Hastings Chamberlin’s The Theory of Monopo-
listic Competition. Although Robinson revived the marginal revolution, in
general Chamberlin is considered to be ‘the true revolutionary’ (Blaug,
is even more surprising considering that Cournot already used the concept of marginal
revenue in 1838, and derived the familiar first-order condition for profit maximisation:
marginal revenue equals marginal cost (Cournot, 1838).
7 See Harrod (1967) for a review of his thoughts on this matter.
8 Chamberlin, for example, attributed the origins and inspiration of his theory to the fa-
mous Taussig–Pigou controversy on railway rates which took place around 1900. This
controversy was about the explanation of different railway rates. Taussig tried to fit dif-
ferent railway rates into the Marshallian theory of (competitive) joint supply by assuming
that a unit rail supply is not homogeneous and that different demand elasticities for dif-
ferent stretches of railway result in different prices. In contrast, Pigou stated that it was
not an issue of heterogeneity, but of monopoly coupled with the conditions necessary for
price discrimination which could explain price differences. In general it is thought that
Pigou won the debate.
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Figure 1.1 Chamberlinian monopolistic competition equilibrium
1997, p. 376).9 This radical new analysis was a first answer to the question
that was raised in 1926 by Sraffa: is it possible in a market characterised
by monopolistic competition and declining average and marginal costs to
reach an equilibrium? Figure 1.1 illustrates the equilibrium in themonop-
olistic equilibrium. Chamberlin makes four basic assumptions (Bishop,
1967, p. 252):
 The number of sellers in a group of firms is sufficiently large so that each
firm takes the behaviour of other firms in the group as given (Cournot–
Nash assumption)
 The group is well defined and small relative to the economy
 Products are physically similar but economically differentiated: buyers
have preferences for all types of products
 There is free entry and exit.
The monopolistic elements are all those elements that distinguish a
product fromanother product and give the firm somemarket power; ‘each
“product” is rendered unique by the individuality of the establishment in
which it is sold, including its location (as well as by trade marks, qualita-
tive differences, etc); this is its monopolistic aspect’ (Chamberlin, 1933,
p. 63). The large number of firms in the market and the possibility of
9 Moreover, the history of Chamberlin’s seminal work dates back to 1921 – see the remarks
by Schumpeter (1954, p. 1150).
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entry and exit of many firms provides the competitive elements; ‘Each
[product] is subject to the competition of other “products” sold under
different circumstances and at other locations; this is its competitive as-
pect’ (1933, p. 63).
We illustrate the Chamberlinian model with the aid of figure 1.1.10 We
assume that all actual and potential suppliers in the group face the same
demand and cost conditions and depict the situation for one particular
firm in isolation. There are two demand curves in the diagram. The
individual firm under consideration faces demand curve d. This curve
represents the firm’s price–sales combinations under the assumption that
all other firms in the group keep their prices unchanged. Archibald calls
this the ‘perceived’ demand curve (1987, p. 532). The steeper curve
labelled D is the demand facing each firm if all firms in the group set
their prices identically. Archibald (1987, p. 532) refers to this curve as the
‘share-of-the-market’ demand curve. As usual MR is marginal revenue
(associated with the perceived demand curve d), AC is the firm’s average
cost,MC is marginal cost, P is the price of the differentiated commodity,
and X is the volume of sales.
The Chamberlinian equilibrium under free entry/exit of firms is at
point E, where the price is Pm and output is Xm. Point E is the equilib-
rium because (a) the individual firm attains an optimum in that point,
and (b) there are no unexploited profit opportunities, excess profits are
exactly zero and no entry/exit of firms takes place. The validity of these
requirements can be demonstrated as follows. The individual firm max-
imises its profit, taking as given the demand curve d. It finds the optimum
point by equating marginal revenue and marginal cost (see point A di-
rectly below point E). In point E the demand curve d is tangent to the
average cost curve, AC, so the firmmakes zero profits. This is the famous
Chamberlinian tangency condition. Since all firms are identical, no firm
makes profits or losses and there is no entry or exit of firms.
Chamberlin (1933, p. 91) also sketched the adjustment process towards
the equilibrium point. Assume that all firms in the group are initially
operating along the demand curve d ′ at point B, set a price of P ′, and
produce a quantity X′. At this price–output combination, each firmwould
make a positive profit equal to the shaded area in figure 1.1. But point B
cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, in that point the individual firm will
have an incentive to lower its price (and increase its profits) by moving
to the right along the d ′ curve (recall that each firm operates under the
assumption that its competitors will continue to charge P ′). But each firm
has exactly the same incentives, so they will all follow suit and cut their
10 This diagram is adjusted from Bishop (1967, p. 252).
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prices. As a result the d ′ curve will shift down along the D curve towards
the Chamberlinian equilibrium at point E.11
Obviously, owing to the downward sloping individual demand curve,
there is a difference between equilibrium average cost and minimum av-
erage cost in the Chamberlinian equilibrium. This implies that there are
unexploited economies of scale and the question arises whether this rep-
resents a waste of resources. The answer to this question is both ‘yes’
and ‘no’. ‘Yes’, in the sense that indeed there is excess capacity and ‘no’,
in the sense that product differentiation introduces variety and this ex-
pands the extent of consumer choices and thereby welfare. As Eaton
and Lipsey put it, ‘in a society that values diversity, there is a trade-off
between economizing on resources, by reducing the costs of producing
existing products, and satisfying the desire for diversity, by increasing
the number of products’ (1989, p. 763). We will return to this topic
in more detail when discussing the second monopolistic competition
revolution.
Given the elegance of the monopolistic competition model it is sur-
prising to see how little influence it had on economic theory. The first
attacks on the earlymonopolistic competition revolution came fromHicks
(1939, pp. 83–5) and somewhat later from Stigler (1949) and Friedman
(1953). Hicks rejected the theory because he was unable to translate it
into a workable model. Stigler (1949) rejected the theory for method-
ological reasons. He claimed that the predictions derived from the theory
of monopolistic competition are not very different from those of per-
fect competition. Occam’s razor then suggests that perfect competition
should be favoured over monopolistic competition, a line of reasoning to
which Friedman also adheres. It was put forward even more strongly by
Archibald (1961, p. 14): ‘The theory is not totally empty, but very nearly
so’ (see also Samuelson, 1967, for a further discussion of this debate). In
addition Stigler raised an important point by noting that:
ProfessorChamberlin’s failure to construct an analytical system capable of dealing
informatively with his picture of reality is not hard to explain. The fundamental
fact is that, althoughChamberlin could throwoff the shackles ofMarshall’s view of
economic life, he could not throw off the shackles of Marshall’s view of economic
analysis. Marshall’s technique was appropriate to the problem set to it: it deals
informatively and with tolerable logic with the world of competitive industries
and monopolies. But it is lost in the sea of diversity and unsystematism, and
Chamberlin is lost with it. (Stigler, 1949, p. 22)
11 Note that the position of the D curve depends on the number of firms in the group.
In figure 1.1, D is consistent with the Chamberlinian equilibrium at E. As a result, the
thought experiment conducted above does not prompt entry of firms. It just shows that
E is the only conceivable Chamberlinian (Cournot–Nash) equilibrium.
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